I. INTRODUCTION
The production of any commodity is subject to a number of constraints that are collectively known as friction. Examples abound. In a large organization such as a hospital or a call center, a large workforce must be maintained to ensure effective delivery of services. New employees are required to increase capacity of service, but proper talent must be identified and trained to be placed in position, which takes time. In supplying a seasonal fashion product, the retailer maintains a small inventory which is available at short notice, while maintaining a contract with the supplier for deliverables in case of an unexpected surge in demand. It is more economical to have such a contract than to maintain inventory, but it takes some time to deliver the product from the supplier to the retailer if demand increases unexpectedly ( [1] ).
If there is an unexpected increase in demand then it will take some time for supply to catch up with demand. However, one might still expect the market price to hover near the marginal production cost as long as the supply side friction is not severe. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that extreme price volatility, or a persistent deviation of the market price away from the marginal cost, are evidence of market failure or the presence of non-competitive behavior. In this paper we ask whether these conclusions are truly justified. This research project was motivated in part by events in the California wholesale electricity market between 1998-2000, which apparently did not function as envisioned by policy makers. As early as 1998, the ancillary service market repeatedly experienced dramatic price spikes, followed by extended periods of near zero prices, which is considered early evidence of market dysfunction ( [2] , [3] , [4] and [5] ). This prompted a series of attempts to improve the market design (e.g. [6] , [7] , [8] , and [9] ). The challenge is eloquently described by [10] : The difficulties that have appeared in California and elsewhere are intrinsic to the design of current electricity markets: Demand exhibits virtually no price responsiveness and supply faces strict production constraints and very costly storage. Such a structure will necessarily lead to periods of surplus and of shortage, the latter resulting from both real scarcity of electricity and from sellers exercising market power. Extreme volatility in prices and profits will be the outcome.
The main objective of this paper is to address the following series of questions. Suppose that observed market prices show repeated upward spikes followed by extended periods in which prices are essentially zero, showing no tendency to converge to the marginal production cost. Based on these observations, can we conclude that the market is dysfunctional and some suppliers are exercising market power? If non-competitive behavior exists in the market, how can we diagnose its presence?
We demonstrate that wild fluctuations of market prices are implied rather than refuted by the efficient market. The marginal production cost is no longer a determinant factor for the market clearing price, and the long-run average price is always greater than the marginal production cost. In the short run, it is possible that the supplier extracts seemingly excessive portion of the gains from trading, leaving little to the consumers, while the market remains efficient.
In the first part of the paper it is assumed that all agents are price takers. This eliminates any room for market manipulation. Section V describes extensions to a monopolistic market in which the supplier can set the price of the service conditioned on each state.
We opt for a particular monopolistic market structure that captures two important conventions in the wholesale electricity market. First, the number of consumers is small, and therefore, the demand by a single consumer affects the aggregate demand. Second, a supply curve is presented by the supplier that represents a menu of prices as a function of quantities.
For a single consumer the monopolistic outcome can be characterized, and in the case of multiple consumers there exist corresponding monopolistic outcomes. Under general conditions any of these outcomes are efficient, yet result in zero surplus to the consumers. Remarkably, the spot price can at some times be lower than the price obtained in the competitive equilibrium outcome in which all participants are price takers. However, the long-run average prices are ordered,
where the average prices are defined for the monopolistic and competitive models, e.g.,
The basic model considered in this paper consists of suppliers and consumers. Consumer demand evolves in continuous time, and a consumer realizes surplus if the service is delivered. If the service cannot be delivered despite the standing order, the consumer suffers inconvenience, which is quantified as negative utility. The supplier can provide the service instantaneously up to the capacity at zero marginal cost. The supplier must pay for the cost of capacity.
The market is subject to supply side friction: Capacity cannot be increased instantaneously, although capacity can be shut down instantaneously without incurring any extra cost (free disposal).
Because demand is unpredictable and the consumer must bear the cost of inconvenience, it is reasonable for the consumer to purchase an extra amount over the instantaneous demand as a precautionary measure, which is commonly known as reserve. However, the consumer cannot purchase extra units for future use since the good is not storable. Instead, the consumer makes a contract with the supplier to maintain extra capacity so that the supplier can offer service immediately in response to a sudden increase in demand. While this extra capacity serves as the reserve in the conventional sense, it is the supplier rather than the consumer who keeps the excess capacity, and who is paid for the extra capacity by the consumer. Theorem 3.1 contains a complete characterization of the competitive equilibrium outcome, while Theorem 3.2 describes its welfare properties. The closed form solution for the equilibrium price functional is represented as a function of simple equilibrium state variables, rather than the entire trajectory of outcomes. If the costs are linear, then the equilibrium price at time t can be expressed as a static function of the equilibrium reserve R e (t) and demand D(t) via P e (t) = p e (R e (t), D(t)). The equilibrium price functional is a piecewise linear function of the equilibrium reserve process,
where c bo is the marginal cost imposed upon the consumer in case demand is not met, and v is the marginal reservation value of the consumer. The sum c bo +v is in fact the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay, often called the chokeup price.
The equilibrium price function has three most surprising features. First, the realized prices fluctuate between the choke-up price and 0 with no tendency to converge to the marginal production cost, regardless of the size of the friction. If the market does not have sufficient reserve (r e < 0) then the market price hits the choke-up price. On the other hand, the market price falls to zero if there is excess capacity (r > 0). Wild swings of prices arise even if the market is free from any strategic manipulation.
Second, It is remarkable that the marginal production cost is irrelevant in determining (I.3), or the generalization given in Theorem 3.1, however large the ramping rate constraint might be. In fact, the price coincides with the marginal utility seen by the consumer.
Third, the equilibrium allocation is efficient, despite the fact that the market price is never equal to the marginal production cost, which has been the benchmark for the social value of the good. The deviation of the market price from the marginal production cost is often suggested as evidence of market dysfunction ( [3] ). This observation is accurate in the market without any supply side friction. But, with the presence of the supply side friction, the supplier has a reason to increase the reserve, even if the spot market price for the reserve is 0, because a large reserve can meet a large demand in the future.
Consider a time at which the supplier has a small but positive reserve capacity. At this time the supplier cannot recover the capacity cost since the market price is zero. Yet, in the competitive equilibrium he does not reduce capacity because there is a positive chance that demand will increase sharply in the near future. If he reduces the capacity now, he will lose the future opportunity of large profit arising from sharply increased demand. As a result, instead of reducing the capacity, he has incentive to increase the capacity until it 46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. [12] [13] [14] 2007 WeB05.5 reaches the optimal level, which is characterized in Proposition 2.3. The spot market price reflects only the value of the service at this moment, not the value of the reserve capacity. Yet, the spot market price sends out proper signals to induce the supplier to choose the efficient amount of reserve at each moment.
The source of the discontinuity of the dynamics of the equilibrium market price is the lack of tradable capacity that can adjust its level of service instantaneously as the demand changes. In the presence of rapid changes in demand, the market experiences shortage or excess supply at each instant. If the economy has a sufficient amount of capacity that can be adjusted at the same rate of the demand, the price volatility vanishes.
A complete analysis of the market with supply side friction and with strategic players is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we explore the monopolistic market in which the supplier can set the delivery price as a function of time, subject to the incentive and individual rationality constraints of the consumers. The incentive constraint imposes a tight restriction on the set of feasible pricing rules for the monopolist. If the monopolist can only observe the aggregate demand, but cannot condition the pricing rule on the individual demand, then he cannot do better than in the competitive market. The conclusions are very different if the monopolist can detect a deviation by a single buyer. In this case the equilibrium price functional is reinterpreted as a pricing rule set by the monopolist. In the special case of a single consumer, the pricing rule is given by,
Although for some values of (r, d) this price can be lower than obtained from (I.3), the average prices satisfy (I.1). In fact, the prices are such that the monopolist extracts the entire gain from trading, driving down the consumer's welfare to the security level payoff. These conclusions suggest that the distribution of the surplus from trading can be used to diagnose the presence of strategic behavior. The prices obtained from the equilibrium price functional (I.3) or the monopolist's pricing rule (I.4) replicate the important qualitative features of the price dynamics shown Figure 1 for four different wholesale electricity markets in Europe and North America. Note that the prices of power in Ontario and Europe are recent, and the severe volatility shown in the European market is typical behavior that has persisted for several years. However, we do not assert that the recent episodes in California were not caused by strategic behavior of the participants -there is ample evidence of noncompetitive behavior. Rather, the main result of this paper should serve as a wake-up call that the insight built around a static analysis can be fragile. The welfare evaluation of dynamic markets with friction requires new analytic tools and a fresh perspective. This paper follows an extensive literature on market friction and volatility (e.g., [11] ). Our model differs from existing models as do our conclusions: we exhibit stark discontinuities in the distribution of the gains from trading, and the volatility of the market price.
In contrast to most existing results based on a static analysis (e.g. [12] and [13] ), [14] examines the dynamic decision problem of the generator subject to upward and downward ramping constraints to show that the resulting optimal policy of the price-taking generator may deviate from the marginal cost pricing. Our model differs from [14] in a couple of important ways. First, in our model, the market price is determined endogenously, while the conclusions of [14] are based upon an empirical study of actual electricity markets. Second, we obtain the deviation from marginal cost pricing as a consequence of the upward ramping rate constraint alone. Scoring and settlement rules are proposed in [15] to implement an efficient allocation in the ancillary service market. Our model suggests that even without an elaborate auction mechanism, the competitive market can internalize the supply side friction to achieve an efficient allocation in a dynamic sense.
The management of reserves is very similar to inventory management in manufacturing applications. While the bulk of research has concentrated on joint pricing and inventory control in a single-period model, 1 dynamic versions of this problem are treated in recent work ( [19] , [20] , [21] and [18] ). In some special cases it is found that price is roughly independent of state ( [19] ), in sharp contrast to what is found in this paper. A two period inventory control problem is introduced in [22] to show that under certain conditions a unique price process exists that can support the efficient allocation; The present paper investigates an infinite-horizon model.
Several recent papers analyze energy markets by applying dynamic programming techniques. [23] investigate a stochastic model for an electricity market while [24] examines dynamic competitive equilibria for a model of a petroleum market. A key conclusion is that the competitive market is efficient and that prices coincide with marginal cost. However, to obtain these conclusions the authors explicitly assume that no hard constraints are active. The finite ramping constraint is often binding in the model considered here, which is shown to generate discontinuities in the market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formally describes the model and a more general nonlinear cost structure. Section III contains a characterization of the competitive equilibrium price and the welfare properties of the equilibrium outcome, and properties of the competitive equilibrium are developed in Section IV. Section V investigates monopolistic markets. Section VI concludes the paper. particular, discussions with R. Johari led to improvements in the main result of this paper beyond the preliminary results announced in [25] .
II. MODEL
Throughout this section we consider a market consisting of a single consumer and supplier who are price takers. These two price taking agents actually represent an aggregate of a continuum of identical consumers and suppliers in a large market. The assumptions are organized into dynamic and market considerations.
DYNAMICS We let G(t) denote the available capacity, D(t) the demand, and R(t) = G(t) − D(t) the reserve at time t. We often refer to the commodity as the service since it is not storable. Once g = G(t) units of capacity is built, the supplier can deliver up to g units of service freely and instantaneously at time t.
It is assumed that consumer demand is perfectly inelastic. This is formalized by writing demand at time t as a deterministic function of an exogenous process Υ evolving on a general topological state space Y,
It is assumed that Υ is strong-Markov and CADLAG (the sample paths are right continuous, with left-hand limits), and that d : Y → R is continuous. For computation it is convenient to consider the Gaussian model,
where N is a driftless Brownian motion with instantaneous variance σ 2 and N (0) = 0. Observe that in this case demand can be negative, which can hold in a normalized model in which forecast demand has been subtracted.
Production is subject to friction, in the sense that the production capacity cannot increase instantaneously: There exists ζ + ∈ (0, ∞) such that for all t ≥ 0 and all t ′ > t,
On the other hand, we maintain the assumption of free disposal so that no corresponding lower bound is imposed.
COSTS AND MARKET ASSUMPTIONS The production technology of the supplier is subject to a production cost c(G(t)) for the production capacity G(t) made available at time t ≥ 0. The cost incurs when the capacity is built, regardless of the delivery of the goods. The cost is assumed convex and increasing.
For each unit of the good delivered, the consumer obtains v units of utility. Thus, the utility of the consumer is v min (D(t), G(t) ). On the other hand, if the demand is not met, the consumer suffers utility loss c bo (R(t)), where the function c bo : R → R + is convex, strictly decreasing on (−∞, 0), and zero on [0, ∞).
The (spot) price at which the service is traded is denoted P (t) at time t. For analytic convenience we restrict to Markovian prices for which the market price at time t is completely determined by the state variable Υ(t) introduced in (II.5): For a function p : Y → R + ,
There is flexibility in the choice of Υ, so that the restriction to Markovian prices is a mild one. Under certain conditions we find that it is possible to take the pair of demand and reserve in equilibrium, Υ = (D, R e ). Welfare functions of the supplier and consumer are defined for each t by, respectively,
It is assumed that the consumer and supplier have the same time preference, represented by discount rate γ > 0. The supplier's objective function is the long-run discounted expected profit with discount rate γ, 10) and the consumer's objective function is defined similarly,
Based on these objective functions we formalize a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2.1:
A competitive equilibrium is a pair of prices and supply {P e , G e } satisfying,
In this case, P e is called a competitive equilibrium price process.
⊓ ⊔
We use efficiency as the criterion for evaluating the welfare performance of the market.
Definition 2.2:
A social planner's problem is
where
and its solution G * is called an efficient allocation.
⊓ ⊔
We assume that the social planner's problem (II.12) has a solution, which is indeed the case if the demand process evolves according to (II.6).
Proposition 2.3:
Suppose that D evolves according to (II.6), and that all costs are linear. For a given discount rate γ > 0, let θ * denote the positive solution to the quadratic equation, 46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. 12-14, 2007 WeB05.5
Then, the social planner's problem has a solution and the efficient allocation is characterized as a threshold policy, so that R * is a reflected Brownian motion on (−∞, r * ] satisfying,
PROOF See [25] and [25] , following [26] .
⊓ ⊔
Let {P e , G e } be a competitive equilibrium. If G e is an efficient allocation, then we say that the equilibrium is efficient. If every competitive equilibrium is efficient, then we say that the first welfare theorem holds.
Suppose that the supplier can adjust the production capacity instantaneously at each period (ζ + = ∞). Then, in the competitive equilibrium, the production capacity must be such that it can provide the demand at each point of time, and the market price must be precisely the marginal capacity cost:
Under the same assumption, the supplier's optimal strategy is myopic: meet the present demand and sell the commodity at its marginal cost. As a result, the market outcome of the dynamic model is little more than the repetition of the static outcomes. Since the supplier can produce each unit at the same marginal cost, the market price is equal to c ′ (D(t)) for each t. The competitive equilibrium is efficient in an economy without friction, and the consumer receives a positive amount of surplus from trading. In particular, if the capacity cost is linear, then the supplier's surplus is 0.
If ζ + < ∞ is very large then the economy is "close" to an economy without any friction, because the supplier can respond to the excess demand quickly, if not instantaneously. An important question is whether the market outcome is close to the outcome realized when the supply is frictionless. The answer is anything but expected.
III. ANALYSIS
To place the social planner's problem within a standard optimal control setting we expand the state process as follows,
to obtain a controlled Markov process on the state space
A policy is called Markovian if the resulting process X † is a strong Markov process on R×Y, whose sample paths are CADLAG on (0, ∞). Note that we allow a jump at the origin, in which case the right-continuity assumption is violated at t = 0.
In the social planner's problem we find that R is a Markovian state for the purposes of optimal control, provided the demand is Brownian motion, of the form (II.6). The state space must be suitably expanded for more general demand processes. This step is also required to ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Although the respective optimization problems posed by the social planner and the consumer are similar, there is one significant difference that has profound economic implications: In the competitive market, ramping rates are not considered in the optimization problem posed by the consumer.
The first main result of this paper characterizes the possible competitive equilibrium price processes. For linear blackout cost, the price functional (III.14) becomes (I.3).
Theorem 3.1: Suppose that there is a competitive equilibrium {P e , G e }. Then, the competitive equilibrium price process must satisfy P e (t) = p e (R e (t), D(t)) for t ≥ 0, where R e is the reserve process in the competitive equilibrium, and the function p e :
(III.14)
⊓ ⊔
A proof of efficiency follows much as in a standard static analysis.
Theorem 3.2: Any competitive equilibrium is efficient.
The equilibrium price functional (III.14) reveals that a competitive equilibrium entails extreme price volatility. The efficient equilibrium price can fluctuate between zero and the choke-up price as the market demand fluctuates. Thus, one cannot deduce market failure based on extreme price volatility.
IV. PROPERTIES OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA
It is instructive to examine how the equilibrium outcome depends on key factors such as the ramp-constraint. To allow for exact computation we focus on the Brownian model in which the (normalized) demand evolves according to (II.6). We also assume that the utility loss c bo is linear on (−∞, 0). Theorem 3.2 allows us to infer properties of the competitive equilibrium through properties of the efficient allocations summarized in Proposition 2.3.
The construction of the threshold value in a proof of Proposition 2.3 is obtained by considering an initial condition satisfying R(0) ≫ 0 so that R(0+) =r * . Let T denote an exponential random variable with parameter γ that is independent of D. The distribution of R(T ) is then exponential with parameter θ * ; This allows the computation of the objective function in the social planner's problem (II.12) via,
An explicit expression for the right hand side is obtained via elementary calculus when R(T ) has an exponential distribution. From the form of the parameter θ * we obtain,
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Consequently, the expected price at time T can be computed as follows,
(IV.15) The consumer pays exactly the marginal price of the service on average in a competitive equilibrium, which is consistent with the conclusion that the outcome is efficient.
However, these conclusions hold only for large initial reserves at the random time T . Similar arguments show that the average price (I.2) always exceeds c, that E[P e (T ) | R e (0) = r] > c for any r < r * , and that the expected price approaches the maximum value c bo + v as r tends to −∞.
The equilibrium payoff to the consumer at time t is obtained from (II.9) combined with the price process (I.3),
Under the assumption that normalized demand has zero mean, the expected value is
For comparison, suppose that the consumer drops out of the market, in which case the consumer welfare at time t is the security level payoff,
Thus, the expected consumer surplus generated from the competitive market at any time t is given by the non-negative quantity,
We shall use (IV.18) as a benchmark in examining the monopolistic market.
V. MONOPOLISTIC MARKET
We have examined a competitive market in which strategic behavior is rigorously eliminated, and found that the extreme fluctuation of market prices cannot be considered as evidence of non-competitive behavior. A natural question is which features of the competitive equilibrium can be used to diagnose the presence of market power. To begin to understand this question we examine another extreme form of the market structure in which there is a single supplier who sets the delivery price of the commodity.
The model considered here is a stylized version of a wholesale electricity market. We focus on the following two features: (i) The supplier serves only a few consumers; In this case the approximation by a continuum of small consumers is overly crude since the decision of a single consumer can have non-negligible impact on the market. (ii) The supplier is asked to present a "supply curve" instead of a single price. It is assumed that the price is of the form
, where the function p M is nonnegative valued.
It is assumed that there are K consumers, indexed by k = 1, . . . , K, each with their own demand process, denoted D k .
The available capacity for the kth consumer is denoted G k , and the reserve is the difference R k (t) := G k (t) − D k (t), t ≥ 0. Given the market price P (t), the kth consumer's welfare function is defined as in (II.9),
19) The monopolist's welfare function W S (t) is given in (II.9) with G(t) := k G k (t).
Definition 5.1: A monopolistic market outcome is a price process P M defined by a pricing rule p M together with vector capacity G M satisfying for each k,
The difference in definitions is that the welfare functions depend on P M , which depends on the vector-valued process G. In the competitive equilibrium model the price is assumed independent of the action of any individual agent.
A. A single consumer
Consider first the simplest case in which K = 1. When the blackout cost is linear on (−∞, 0) then arguments in [25] imply that an equilibrium market price is given by a function of reserve and demand,
, where the pricing rule is given in (I.4). Theorem 5.2 generalizes this result.
Theorem 5.2: Suppose that the demand process satisfies (II.5) with Υ a Markov process on the general state space Y. If p M is a monopolist's equilibrium pricing rule, then it must satisfy for each r and y, for some τ (y) ≥ 0,
B. Multiple consumers
We now consider the general case. Suppose that there is a monopolistic market outcome based on a pricing rule of the form p M ( r, y), where r denotes a possible value of the Kdimensional vector of reserves, R(t) = (R 1 (t), . . . , R K (t)), and y ∈ Y is a possible value of Υ.
An upper bound on the pricing rule can be obtained using the assumption that each consumer is myopic. If g e is a monopolist's market outcome, then for each k the welfare of consumer k is no worse than the security level payoff. From the expression
) we obtain the lower bound,
Rearranging terms gives
The right hand side is identical to (I.4), but with r replaced by r e k . To obtain further insight we apply calculus. Each consumer faces an unconstrained optimization problem, so that the first-order necessary condition for optimality can be applied. Suppose that the derivative of p M with respect to r k exists at some value ( r, d) and some k. Then the first-order condition for optimality gives,
which immediately gives,
This is a differential equation that admits many solutions. One is identical to (V.22) with equality,
Another is identical to the pricing rule (I.3),
However, the pricing rule (V.25) violates the upper bound (V.22) when r k and d k are each negative. We arrive at two questions: How can the right hand side of (V.24) be independent of k? And, if so, is there an equilibrium using this pricing rule? We obtain positive answers in the un-normalized model in which G k (t) is nonnegative for each t and k.
There is some flexibility in the construction of a pricing rule since these formulae need only hold in equilibrium. Consider the pricing rule defined on all of R K × Y by the maximum,
Under the assumption that g k is non-negative for each k, the bound (V.22) implies that p M ( r, y) is an upper bound on any pricing rule.
Theorem 5.3: Consider the un-normalized model consisting of K consumers with non-negative capacity. Suppose that there exists a scalar process G * that solves the social planner's problem (II.12) subject to cumulative demand pro-
outcome, where the reserves are divided proportionately, 27) and the price process P M is defined using the pricing rule (V.26).
The equilibrium is efficient, and consumer receives precisely his security level payoff.
PROOF First of all, the identity (V.24) holds for each k when G * is defined using (V.27), and the pricing rule is (V.26). However, the calculus leading to the derivation of this identity is violated for the pricing rule (V.26) since p M is not smooth. Hence we must establish the equilibrium property using different means.
Suppose that consumer k deviates from G * k (t) at time t, choosing instead G k (t). If he gains an increase in welfare, then the welfare must exceed the security level payoff. Recalling the identity (V.21), this implies the bound used to establish (V.22),
) where the final equality holds since demand is non-negative. We consider two cases. First, suppose that the price increases. From the definition of the price as a maximum, it follows that (V.24) holds, so that
This violates (V.28). Suppose then that the price remains constant when G * k (t) is replaced by G k (t). Note that it cannot decrease by unilateral action since the price is defined as a maximum. If the price does not change then we obtain a bound,
In this case the welfare is bounded above as follows:
We again obtain a contradiction of (V.28), which shows that this is an equilibrium from the point of view of the consumer. The proof that this is an equilibrium from the point of view of the supplier is identical to the proof obtained with K = 1 [25] .
⊓ ⊔
The monopolistic equilibrium pricing rule p M entails considerable volatility, ranging between v + c bo and 0, as illustrated in Figure 2 . While the monopolist market is as volatile as the competitive market, the consumers are certainly worse off in the monopolistic market as their payoff is driven down to the security level payoff (IV.17).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the models are highly stylized, the message is very much relevant to observations of deregulated electricity markets around the world. We have seen that a simple example can replicate the extreme volatility seen in today's power markets. What is remarkable is that extreme volatility is an intrinsic part of the competitive market equilibrium, and the degree of volatility has little to do with the welfare 46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. [12] [13] [14] 2007 WeB05.5 properties of the market outcomes. The analysis of the monopolistic market indicates that the volatility of the market price might not be a suitable indicator for diagnosing noncompetitive behavior. In contrast, the consumer welfare is sensitive to market structure. Because the marginal pricing rule can be recovered in the competitive market in a weak sense, as described by (IV.15), we can diagnose the non-competitive behavior by estimating the expected delivery price of the commodity, and the expected consumer surplus. While (IV.15) offers a testable implication of the model, we must point out that this is only a mild implication. It is still possible that data generated from a "young" market can show that the consumer surplus is extreme low, even if the market is efficient.
We believe that the diagnosis of market power should be based on a well calibrated dynamic model and its equilibrium outcomes, which includes the collection of feasible price processes.
We have noted that the existence of a centralized optimal outcome is established in [25] for the model with Brownian demand (II.6). The analysis allows multiple generators with heterogeneous ramp constraints. The optimal solution is characterized by computable thresholds, much like classical solutions to centralized optimal control in inventory models ( [27] and [28] ). The paper [29] contains extensions of the main result of [25] to a network of generators and consumers connected by constrained power lines. Even in the case of Brownian demand, a closed form expression for the social planner's problem is not possible when there are constraints on links. However, it is possible to obtain structural properties of the optimal solution. These results will be applied to understand the competitive benchmark in future market analysis.
